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TO GROW STRONG TREES START WITH GOOD SOIL: 
OMBUDSMEN & FOUNDATIONS FOR PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN VANUATU & THE PACIFIC  
NARELLE BEDFORD* 
Samari 
Stamba tingting long toktok blong Article ia hemi stap givim wan lukluk long fasin blong 
Ombudsman insaed long region blong Pacific Islands we hemi lukluk moa long public 
accountability long Vanuatu. Public Accountability hemi stap minim se yumi lukluk long ol 
fasin blong pipol mo hao yumi usum mane blong gavman. Blong gat wan Ombudsman hemi 
wan gudfala model blong yumi long Pacific Aelan.  
Précis 
Cet article est un étude de cas de l'Ombudsman (ou Médiateur) dans la région du Pacifique, 
avec un aperçu sur la responsabilité publique au Vanuatu. La création d'un Ombudsman ou 
Médiateur est devenue un modèle dominant dans la région du Pacifique. L’article conclut 
que fournir une base solide pour la responsabilité publique peut être une question complexe 
avec beaucoup de différents éléments et approches possibles. 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of public accountability and need for integrity in government 
decision-making has been accepted in legal systems generally and this holds true in the 
Pacific.1 Public accountability in this context refers to the public law aspiration to safeguard a 
fair and just society and the accompanying mechanisms which ensure that legislation, 
decisions, and actions of government are made in accordance with law. Throughout this 
																																								 																				
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Australia; member of the Pacific Constitutions Network, 
University of South Pacific and the Transnational, International and Comparative Law and Policy Network, 
Bond University. This article draws on a presentation to the Conference organised by L'Université Toulouse 
Capitole, ‘Le Vanuatu: Oscillation entre diversité et unité’ held in Vanuatu, April 2016. The research assistance 
expertly provided by Jake Buckingham for this article is gratefully acknowledged. The title for this article was 
inspired by the memory of Joe Bomal Carlo. 
1 See generally Michael Dowdle, Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Morgan Wesley, ‘Overlapping Authorities: Governance, Leadership and Accountability 
in Contemporary Vanuatu’ (2013) 15 Journal of South Pacific Law 1.  
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analysis the concept of requiring governments to be responsible for their actions and 
decisions is termed ‘public accountability’. It is closely related to the concept of good 
governance, which draws a broader circle than the traditional meaning ascribed to 
government and includes the ‘traditions, institutions, mechanisms and processes that 
determine how power is exercised’ as well as the role of citizens and non-government 
organisations.2 This analysis will focus on public accountability through Ombudsmen in the 
Pacific, featuring a detailed case study on Vanuatu and the role of its Ombudsman. The paper 
will argue that constitutional embedding of key accountability institutions can provide a basis 
for the development of a culture of accountability and a foundation to build future 
improvements upon. The development of a culture of accountability also requires a broad, 
complex network of institutions and people and this wider system operating within Vanuatu 
will also be explored.  
For the purposes of this article, analysis will be focused on those 12 nations and territories 
which participate in the University of the South Pacific (USP) and also Papua New Guinea 
(PNG).3 The aim in selecting these 13 nations and territories was to generate a discussion 
about public accountability whilst also illustrating there is no one model that is a perfect 
template. While there are many ways to define the “pacific” – the use of USP provides a 
practical starting point and PNG has been included to offer comprehensive analysis.  
PNG and the 12 USP member nations and territories have all evolved with a pluralistic legal 
system which entwines formal written laws with customary law.4 In these pluralistic legal 
systems, doctrines such as rule of law and separation of powers provide a theoretical basis for 
public accountability.5 In addition to these fundamental doctrines, some Pacific nations and 
territories have also evolved various complementary institutions to uphold and provide 
further strength to public accountability principles. Classically, a constitution (whether 
written or unwritten) may exist as the supreme source of law in the nation.6 Additional 
																																								 																				
2 Graham Hassall, ‘Governance, Legitimacy and the Rule of Law in the South Pacific’ in Anita Jowitt and Dr 
Tess Newton Cain (eds), Passage of Change: Law, Society and Governance in the Pacific (ANU Press, 2010) 
51. 
3 The 12 members are Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu & Vanuatu. 
4 Jennifer Corrin and Don Paterson, Introduction to South Pacific Law (Intersentia, 4th ed, 2017) 6. 
5 Sir John Muria, ‘The Role of the Courts and Legal Profession in Constitutional and Political Disputes in the 
Pacific Islands Nations’ (Address at the Graduation Celebration, University of South Pacific, Emalus Campus, 
Port Vila Vanuatu, 4 December 2001).  
6 Jennifer Corrin-Care, ‘Cultures in Conflict: The Role of the Common Law in the South Pacific’ (2002) 6 
Journal of South Pacific Law 1.  
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institutions such as the Ombudsman, Auditor-General and Human Rights Commissions may 
also exist.7 Other institutions that can be considered part of the broad accountability system 
given their potential roles in enforcing and remedying corruption in public office are Public 
Prosecutors and Public/Legal Aid Solicitors; and for their role in recommending potential 
reforms, the Law Reform Commissions. All of these various institutions have important roles 
and functions; however, the primary focus of this analysis will be the Ombudsman.  
The appeal of an independent investigatory body such as an Ombudsman can be 
demonstrated by the creation of and continuing existence of Ombudsmen (or similar 
institutions) across common law, civil law and countries with pluralistic legal systems. While 
the nomenclature (for example the Ombudsman equivalent in France, and French territories, 
is the le Médiateur de la République) and the role and functions may differ, the essential 
characteristics of these Ombudsmen are enduring. Those essential characteristics include 
impartiality from government; investigatory capacity based upon complaints from the public 
and other referrals; a public reporting capability; and most significantly the power to 
self-initiate investigations.8 Impartiality and independence are crucial features that have been 
identified as the original impetus for the adoption of the Ombudsman model in the Pacific.9  
Within the broad framework of Pacific Ombudsmen, Vanuatu has been selected for particular 
examination as it is a nation that is relatively young and independent with a pluralistic legal 
system (incorporating both common and civil law legacies and ‘Kastom’ (customary law) in 
its history and modern governance). 10 It has been described as having a ‘modified 
Westminster system’ and as being ‘one of the most culturally diverse nations of the world’.11 
Vanuatu exists as a classic example of a hybrid legal system (incorporating common law, 
civil law and Kastom), and of particular interest for this analysis it is a hybrid legal system 
																																								 																				
7 Recognising the challenge of resource constraints in Pacific islands, Jowitt and Hicks proposed a Rights 
Commissioner attached to the Public Solicitors Office as an alternative to a Human Rights Commission in Anita 
Jowitt and Nena Hicks, ‘Human Rights and Transparency of Government Action in Vanuatu – A Comment 
(1997) 1 Journal of South Pacific Law 1. 
8 For a detailed consideration of the Australian Ombudsman’s own motion powers, see Anita Stuhmcke, An 
Empirical Study of the Systemic Investigations Function of the Commonwealth Ombudsman from 1977-2005 
(PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 2009).  
9 Justice Tuiloma Neroni Slade, ‘Law Officers in Pacific Island States’ (1988) 14 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
1433, 1442.  
10 For further detail on the legal system and the place of Kastom in Vanuatu see Miranda Forsyth, A Bird that 
Flies with Two Wings: The Kastom and State Justice Systems in Vanuatu (2009, ANU epress) & Bule H, ‘Law 
and Custom in Vanuatu’ (1986) 2 Queensland Institute of Technology Law Journal 129.  
11  Benedict Sheehy and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ‘Constituting Vanuatu: Societal, Legal and Local 
Perspectives’ (2008) 16 Asia Pacific Law Review 133, 133, 138. 
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which has operated with an Ombudsman enshrined in its written constitution.12 The article 
will consider the specific provisions of the Vanuatu constitution that enshrine public 
accountability principles and establish public accountability mechanisms and institutions. The 
specific institution of the Ombudsman will be considered in detail, and relatedly the 
Leadership Code Act 1998.  
Other topics to be covered in this analysis (although in less detail than the Ombudsman) will 
be the recent implementation of a national right to an information system in Vanuatu,13 and 
the other public accountability institutions in Vanuatu. As Rawlings concluded, ‘oversight 
agencies cannot be examined in isolation. They must be conceptualised relationally within 
the law and justice sector as a total package of regulatory institutions’.14 A holistic approach 
to the role of the Ombudsman in the broader public accountability system recognises that 
non-government organisations, academics and the press as well as formal regulatory 
institutions are all important in generating a culture of accountability.  
Finally, for comparative purposes a mapping exercise will be undertaken to chart the current 
approach to Ombudsmen or equivalent institutions in other USP members and in PNG. The 
article will then provide some concluding observations about the strong foundation that 
constitutional enshrinement can offer both as a basis for empowering and protecting the 
Ombudsman and also its contribution to a culture of public accountability in the Pacific. 
CASE STUDY: VANUATU 
The structure and significance of the Vanuatu constitution 
The foundational public law doctrine of the separation of powers has been given practical 
effect in the structuring of power in written constitutions throughout most of the Pacific.15 
The Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu 1980 (‘the Constitution’) continued this 
approach, but with an indigenous adaptation to recognise Vanuatu’s unique history prior to 
independence. Thus, the Constitution is divided into various chapters, containing the 
																																								 																				
12 On hybridity, see generally Sean Donlan, ‘To Hybridity and Beyond: Reflections on Legal and Normative 
Complexity’ in Vernon Palmer, Mohamed Y. Mattar and Anna Koppel (eds), Mixed Legal Systems, East and 
West (Routledge, 2015) 17; Sue Farran, ‘Pacific Punch: Tropical Flavours of Mixedness in the Island Republic 
of Vanuatu’ in Vernon Palmer, Mohamed Y. Mattar and Anna Koppel (eds), Mixed Legal Systems, East and 
West (Routledge, 2015) 123.  
13 See Right to Information Act 2016, Act No.13 of 2016. 
14 Gregory Rawlings, ‘Regulating Responsively for Oversight Agencies in the Pacific’ in State Society in 
Melanesia Project (February 2006, ANU Epress) 1. 
15 Corrin and Paterson, above n 4, 86.  
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traditional three branches under the separation of powers, with Parliament in Chapter 4, the 
Executive in Chapter 7, and the Judiciary in Chapter 8. Several notable unique refinements 
were added to the written constitution adopted in Vanuatu. Most notable is the priority and 
importance accorded to the National Council of Chiefs in Chapter 5, which is located 
immediately after Parliament in the Constitution. Section 30 of the Constitution provides that 
the National Council of Chiefs ‘has a general competence to discuss all matters relating to 
custom and tradition and may make recommendations for the preservation and promotion of 
ni-Vanuatu culture and languages and it may be consulted on any question, particularly any 
question relating to tradition and custom, in connection with any bill before Parliament’. 
These provisions ensure that there is a constitutionally embedded role for the National 
Council of Chiefs in Vanuatu. 
Within Vanuatu’s pluralistic system, the provisions of Chapter 1 of the Constitution titled 
‘The State and Sovereignty’ are a necessity.16 In section 2, the Constitution is proclaimed to 
be the ‘supreme law of the Republic of Vanuatu’, thus clearly recording that in the event of 
any inconsistency between laws, including Kastom, the Constitution will prevail. Section 3 
states that Bislama is the national language, while Bislama, English and French are the 
official languages. Representative government is entrenched in section 4 which declares that 
‘national sovereignty belongs to the people of Vanuatu which they exercise through their 
elected representatives’. 
Written constitutions typically contain provisions prescribing the necessary process to be 
followed for amending the constitution. Such provisions are contained in Chapter 14 of the 
Constitution, which prescribes that at least a two-thirds majority is needed to pass a Bill to 
amend the Constitution and this requires a quorum of at least three quarters of the Members 
of Parliament to be present and voting.17 Furthermore, in three crucial subject areas - 
language status, electoral system and the Parliamentary system - the Constitution provides 
that it can only be amended if a Bill has first achieved simple majority support in a national 
referendum. 
Written constitutions were common in nations in the Pacific Islands upon attaining 
independence 18 and as such, in part could be regarded initially as aspirational in nature. This 
																																								 																				
16 This chapter contains provisions on supremacy of laws, languages, national sovereignty, electoral franchise 
and political parties. 
17 Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu 1980 s 85. 
18 Corrin and Paterson, above n 4, 84.  
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is evidenced by the fact that many nations took a period of time to fully implement provisions 
contained in constitutions. It is argued that this was the actual situation in Vanuatu in respect 
of two key constitutional provisions which assist to enshrine the concept of public 
accountability – the Ombudsman and the Leadership Code. The Constitution was adopted in 
1980, and yet laws to give effect to these two elements did not pass Parliament for well over 
a decade. 
The Vanuatu Ombudsman 
The Constitution contains specific provisions entrenching the office of the Ombudsman and 
giving it constitutional status.19 The significance of this is that if the Ombudsman was not 
constitutionally established the other alternative would be to establish the institution through 
the provisions of a normal piece of legislation. By nature, normal legislation can be more 
easily amended or repealed by a simple majority vote in Parliament compared to the process 
outlined above for a constitutional provision. This entrenchment in the Constitution thus 
provides a strong signal about the intent of independence leaders to have an enduring 
Ombudsman institution and accords it enhanced democratic protection.20 
Furthermore, the Constitution mandates that wide consultation, including with the National 
Council of Chiefs and the Local Government Councils (and other senior leaders and 
office-holders) takes place before the appointment of an Ombudsman.21 This provides 
another layer of democratic protection through requiring consent by a broad range of senior 
ni-Vanuatu leaders. 
The powers of the Ombudsman to make enquiries may be engaged as a result of a complaint 
from a member of the public; a request by a Minister, a Member of Parliament, the National 
Council of Chiefs or a Local Government Council or, most significantly, by the initiative of 
																																								 																				
19 Chapter 9 ‘Administration’, Part II ‘The Ombudsman’, ss 61-5. 
20 See generally Devika Prasad, ‘Strengthening Democratic Policing and Accountability in the Commonwealth 
Pacific’ (2006) 5 International Journal on Human Rights 109, 116; Ombudsman v Batick; Ombudsman v Jimmy 
[2001] VUSC 45  
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/2001/45.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=title("2001%
20VUSC%2045")>. 
21 Specifically, s 61(1) of the Constitution provides that the Ombudsman is appointed by the President in 
consultation with the Prime Minister, Speaker, leaders of political parties represented in Parliament, Chairman 
of National Council of Chiefs, Chairman of Local Government Councils & Chairmen of Public Service 
Commission & Judicial Services Council. 
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the Ombudsman.22 Importantly, section 65 of the Constitution explicitly states that the 
Ombudsman is not subject to direction or control by any other person, thus providing 
significant constitutional protection of institutional independence. The Ombudsman is 
conferred jurisdiction to enquire into all public servants, public authorities and ministerial 
departments.23 The remaining constitutional provisions cover reports of the Ombudsman and 
a right of citizens to access services by the administration (or executive) of Vanuatu in their 
own language.24 In the latter, the Constitution confers a unique and central role on the 
Ombudsman in enforcing multilingualism in Vanuatu which further requires that there must 
be an annual report to Parliament on the observance of multilingualism and measures to 
ensure respect of the same. In totality, these Ombudsman powers have been considered as 
‘broad’ and encompassing ‘a wider role’ when compared to Ombudsman in other nations.25 
As Crossland noted ‘… the nature of the Ombudsman's functions is more akin to an 
anti-corruption commission than the orthodox model of an Ombudsman.’26 
To supplement these constitutional provisions, in 1995 the Parliament of Vanuatu passed the 
Ombudsman Act.27 However, the first Ombudsman was appointed in 1994, relying upon the 
constitutional provisions for jurisdiction and authority until the substantive Act was passed.28 
The first Ombudsman was the subject of a number of court cases, which cumulatively 
produced a body of Vanuatu Supreme Court jurisprudence on the powers of the 
Ombudsman.29 Each case was ultimately unsuccessful in challenging the constitutional 
																																								 																				
22  Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu 1980 s 62(1); Ombudsman v Kalsakau [1997] VUSC 30 
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/1997/30.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=title("1997%
20VUSC%2030")>. 
23 Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu 1980 s 62(2), but not the President of the Republic, the Judicial 
Service Commission or the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies. 
24 Ibid ss 64-5. 
25 Mareva Betham-Annandale, ‘A Comparison and Contrast of the Role of the Ombudsman in Vanuatu and 
Samoa: Who, What & How can they Investigate?’ (1997) 1 Journal of South Pacific Law; Rene Lal, ‘The 
Diversified or Strict Role of an Ombudsman: A Comparison in the Roles of the Ombudsman in Vanuatu & Fiji’ 
(1997) 1 Journal of South Pacific Law.  
26 KJ Crossland, ‘The Ombudsman Role: Vanuatu’s Experiment’ (Discussion Paper No 00/5, The Australian 
National University Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies) 7. 
27 Act 14 of 1995, commencing on 18 September 1995. 
28 The first Ombudsman was Marie-Noëlle Ferrieux-Patterson, who served from 1994 until 1999 but was not 
re-appointed for a further term. Subsequent Ombudsman have been (listed in order of appointment): Hannington 
G Alatoa, Peter Taurokoto, Pasa Tosusu and Kalkot Mataskelekele. For a more detailed account of the first 
Ombudsman’s era see generally Prasad, above n 20, 128; Graham Hassall, ‘South Pacific’ (1998) 9 Public Law 
Review 69, 75. 
29  See, eg, Virelala v Ombudsman [1997] VUSC 35 
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/1997/35.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=title(Virelala
%20and%20Ombudsman%20)>; Ombudsman v Leymang [1997] VUSC 29 
<http://www.paclii.org/vu/cases/VUSC/1997/29.html?>; Ombudsman v Attorney-General [1997] VUSC 41 
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/1997/41.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=title(Ombuds
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validity of actions taken by the Ombudsman under the Act. However, as result of these 
circumstances, the first Act was subsequently repealed and replaced by a new Act in 1998.30 
This Act conferred the Ombudsman with a standard range of powers (although Transparency 
Vanuatu claim the powers were more restrictive compared to the earlier version of the Act) 
and prescribes procedures to ensure fair treatment.31 Hill summarises the second Act as 
‘lacking the force of the first Act’ and representing ‘less of a threat to those whose conduct is 
likely to be scrutinised’.32 According to Hill, key changes in the second Act as compared to 
the first Act included the staff of the Ombudsman being appointed as public servants, a 
requirement for notice prior to an investigation, and the obligation in respect of allegations of 
criminal wrongdoing to detail the alleged offence and provide evidence, combined with an 
increased role for mediation.33  
The sequence of events spanning the first Act and the second Act does graphically 
demonstrate the power of the legislature, derived from its status of having been elected by the 
people of Vanuatu, to shape accountability institutions in the manner of their choosing and it 
underlines the crucial nature of government support for the Ombudsman to function 
effectively.  
That said, Constitutional enshrinement remains significant as it not only signals a deep 
national commitment to public accountability, but it also can provide a baseline level of 
protection for the Ombudsman. The Constitutional provisions dealing with the Vanuatu 
Ombudsman enabled it to exist and function lawfully in the absence of specific legislation.   
The final conclusions and recommendations arising from an investigation by the Ombudsman 
are formally issued in a written report which is made public, unless it would be contrary to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
man%20and%20Attorney-General%20)>; Ombudsman v Batick; Ombudsman v Jimmy [2001] VUSC 45 
<http://www.paclii.org/vu/cases/VUSC/2001/45.html>.  
30 Act 27 of 1998, commencing on 11 January 1999; Re the President's Referral, President of the Republic of 
Vanuatu v Attorney-General [1998] VUSC 18  
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/1998/18.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=title(Presiden
t's%20Referral,%20President%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Vanuatu%20and%20Attorney-
General%20)>. Also, see generally Hassall, above n 28, 71, 74-5. 
31  Transparency International, National Integrity System Update – Ombudsman and Office of the 
Auditor-General, Update #3. The powers of the Ombudsman are contained in s 11 of the Act. The consequence 
of a breach of procedures was held in The Ombudsman v Jimmy [1996] VUSC 26 to require the withdrawal of 
the report and the investigation be re-conducted. 
32 Edward Hill, ‘The Vanuatu Ombudsman’ in Anita Jowitt and Dr Tess Newton Cain (eds), Passage of Change: 
Law, Society and Governance in the Pacific (ANU Press, 2003) 78. 
33 Ibid 78-9. 
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public security or the public interest.34 It should be noted that no reports have been published 
electronically on the Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute’s (PacLII) database since 
April 2012, or on the Vanuatu Ombudsman’s website.35 The ability for members of the public 
to access reports by the Ombudsman is a necessary element in building a culture of 
transparency, and this is an area on which the Ombudsman needs to take action. It also 
demonstrates a limitation of constitutional embedding, as there are no constitutional 
provisions guaranteeing that the work undertaken by the Ombudsman will be made publicly 
available.  
In an important addition to the typical responsibilities of an Ombudsman, the Vanuatu 
Ombudsman is also empowered to investigate alleged breaches of the Leadership Code Act 
1998.36 Generally, the most significant limitation of the powers of the Ombudsman (and 
related offices globally) is that they are traditionally only able to make formal 
recommendations and cannot compel or enforce action by government. However, the position 
in Vanuatu is nuanced in respect of the Leadership Code, where the Ombudsman can apply to 
the Supreme Court to enforce compliance with powers of investigation.37 This power is 
conferred in section 34(5) of the Leadership Code and can be utilised to ensure access to 
Government contracts, documents, books, accounts and any other material relevant to an 
investigation. 
There are, naturally, some other limits to the powers of the Ombudsman. For instance, when 
exercising powers under the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman cannot investigate and report 
on the conduct of judicial officers.38 More specifically, as Jowitt has noted (albeit in a 
different context concerned with domestic violence and police powers being investigated by 
the Ombudsman), section 19(b) of the Ombudsman Act prevents the Ombudsman from 
																																								 																				
34 Ombudsman Act 1998 (Vanuatu) s 34(2).  
35 See PacLII database <www.paclii.org>; for further information on the subject matter of written reports see 
generally Edward R Hill, Ombudsman of Vanuatu – Digest of Public Reports 1996-2000, UNDP Governance 
and accountability project, January 2001.  
36 s (1)(d)-(e). 
37 Leadership Code Act 1998 (Vanuatu) s 34(5); A common feature of Ombudsman in many jurisdictions is 
powers which are limited to recommendations only - see generally, Judge Anad Satyanand, ‘Growth of the 
Ombudsman Concept’ (1999) 3 Journal of South Pacific Law 1; Sir Kenneth James Keith, ‘Development of the 
Role of the Ombudsman with Reference to the Pacific’ (Speech delivered at the 22nd Australasian and Pacific 
Ombudsman Regional (APOR) Conference, Parliament House, Wellington, New Zealand, 9-11 February 2005). 
38 Section 1 of the Ombudsman Act specifically does not include judicial officers or courts in the definition of 
‘government agency’. 
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inquiring into why recommendations have not been acted upon or actions taken in response to 
recommendations.39 
The Vanuatu Leadership Code Act 
In general terms a Leadership Code has been defined as a set of rules ‘to promote and 
regulate ethical values’ typically through establishing ‘criteria for defining, promoting and 
managing integrity; disclosure; government contracts; conflicts of interest; the application of 
public funds and benefits’. 40  Chapter 10 of the Constitution expressly provides for a 
‘Leadership Code’ covering the conduct of leaders. The Code aims to prevent conflicts of 
interest and uphold the integrity of government in Vanuatu.41 Leader is defined in section 67 
of the Constitution to include the President, Prime Minister, Ministers, Members of 
Parliament, and public servants (and others as prescribed by law). However, in respect of the 
President the position is more nuanced as section 34(1) of the Leadership Code Act expressly 
excludes the President from the role of the Ombudsman in investigating and reporting on the 
conduct of a Leader. In a further interesting point of note, the Ombudsman, while defined as 
a leader in section 5 of the Leadership Code Act, 42  then has an express role in the 
investigation of complaints against leaders under section 34 of the Code.43 
The Parliament of Vanuatu passed the Leadership Code Act in 1998,44 so there was a 
considerable period of delay in implementation from the commencement of the Constitution 
in 1980 until 1998 when the Act was passed. It is possible to conclude therefore that at least 
the standards contained in the Constitution relating to both the Ombudsman and the 
Leadership Code were initially aspirational.  
 
																																								 																				
39 Anita Jowitt, Documenting and Reporting Human Rights Abuses (Violence Against Women and Torture/Ill-
Treatment) Around Efate, Research Report, Transparency International Vanuatu Advocacy & Legal Centre, 
2013. 
40 Rawlings, above n 14, 3, 7. 
41 Leadership Code Act 1998 ss 66-8. 
42 Importantly the Ombudsman is not deemed a ‘public servant’ as the office of the Ombudsman is established 
under the Constitution rather than by a public service employment contract, see Republic of Vanuatu v Bebe 
[2014] VUCA 29  
<http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUCA/2014/29.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=Bebe>. 
43 See also Nari v Republic of Vanuatu [2015] VUSC 132 
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/2015/132.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=ombuds>. 
44 Act 2 of 1998, commencing on 7 September 1998; and also Act 7 of 1999. 
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The powers conferred on the Ombudsman under the Code are extensive and strengthened by 
an enforcement capability through an application to the Supreme Court.45 A decision by the 
Vanuatu Court of Appeal in 2014 upheld an earlier decision by the Supreme Court regarding 
the validity of provisions of the Leadership Code Act.46 Graphically illustrating the gap 
between statutory powers and reality, Transparency International Vanuatu highlighted that by 
2014 there had yet to be a prosecution under the Code and recommended that the Vanuatu 
government take action to ‘ensure that there are consequences for breaches of the Leadership 
Code’.47 Significantly, in 2016 the Vanuatu Court of Appeal upheld convictions for breaches 
of the Leadership Code Act in Tapangararua v Public Prosecutor.48 
The Transparency International Vanuatu 2014 report also criticised the lack of action by the 
Ombudsman in upholding the Code. For example, it stated: 
Lists of leaders who have filed or not filed annual returns are not consistently published in the 
Gazette. Even when leaders fail to file returns and the list is published, no further action is 
taken. The last ombudsman’s public report on this topic was published in 2009 and related to 
188 leaders who had failed to file annual returns in 2007.49 
In a subsequent development, the Vanuatu Law Commission (VLC) reviewed this aspect of 
the Ombudsman’s operations and stated that the present system was ‘ineffective’ and made 
recommendations for reform.50 The reason that the reporting mechanism has attracted the 
attention of such bodies (VLC and Transparency International Vanuatu) is that public 
reporting accomplishes the important function of upholding transparency and public 
accountability in Vanuatu and it is a recognition that continual refinement to make it effective 
is warranted. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
45 Ibid s 34(4). 
46 Tapangararua v Public Prosecutor [2016] VUCA 10  
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUCA/2016/10.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=title(Tapang
ararua%20and%20Public%20Prosecutor%20)>. 
47 Transparency International Vanuatu, National Integrity System Report, 2014, 16,19. 
48 Tapangararua v Public Prosecutor [2016] VUCA 10 [27].  
49 Transparency International Vanuatu, above n 47, 45. 
50 Vanuatu Law Commission Report, Ombudsman and Leadership Code Act Legislative Review, 02/2016, 122. 
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Right to information in Vanuatu 
Another accountability measure that complements the functions of the Ombudsman is the 
existence of a formal mechanism to obtain access to government held information. Enabling 
the public to access government information allows them to be better informed about 
government and therefore able to assess when it might be appropriate to lodge a request for 
Ombudsman investigation. The establishment of a freedom of information regime, preferably 
accompanied by a public awareness campaign, provides citizens with a legal right to 
information and a formal process to access government held information. The existence of 
such legislation in Vanuatu will also act as a counter-balance to the ongoing existence of the 
Official Secrets Act 1980 and its emphasis on the protection of classified material.51 The need 
for an access to information regime and the likely difficulties encountered by small island 
jurisdictions was recognised as early as 2000 by Professor Paterson.52 
In late 2015, national media and regional media organisations reported that the Vanuatu 
government, through the Office of Government and its Chief Information Officer, would be 
progressively implementing the National Right to Information Policy with associated 
legislation expected to pass Parliament in the imminent future.53 An earlier proposed draft 
statute, the Freedom of Information Bill 2006, prepared by Transparency International 
Vanuatu and Media Association Blong Vanuatu did not obtain parliamentary approval due to 
a lack of parliamentary support. The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, while 
encouraging of the draft, prepared a report that contained recommendations for 
improvement.54  
It is therefore significant that the Parliament of Vanuatu’s official website recorded that the 
Right to Information Act was passed by Parliament in late 2016, and the Act is available on 
the PacLII database.55 Once operational this Act will provide additional mechanisms to 
inform the public about government decision-making and thus encourage expanded public 
																																								 																				
51  See generally, Ombudsman v Kombe [1998] VUSC 2; Ombudsman v Kombe [1998] VUSC 3 
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/1998/3.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=title(Ombuds
man%20and%20Kombe%20)>.  
52  Don Paterson, ‘Legal Challenges for Small Island Jurisdictions in Relation to Privacy, Freedom of 
Information and Access to Justice’ (2000) 4 Journal of South Pacific Law 13 (1 January 2000). 
53 Reported by Loop Vanuatu on 20 August 2015 at <www.loopvanuatu.com> and the Pacific Media Assistance 
Scheme at <www.pacmas.org>.  
54 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Analysis of the Republic of Vanuatu Draft Freedom of Information 
Bill 2006 and Recommendations for Amendments, May 2006. 
55 Available at <https://parliament.gov.vu/index.php/icons/bills> (accessed on 8 December 2017) & 
<www.paclii.org/vu/legis Right to Information Act 2016>, Act No. 13 of 2016. 
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accountability in Vanuatu. The creation of a legislative information access regime should be 
viewed as a positive development, even if the legislation and associated public sector 
practices are not perfect or ideal. As demonstrated by recent history this can be an area of 
reform on which it is difficult to garner parliamentary support. Thus, incremental change and 
the commitment to establish a statutory regime, can be influential in and of itself. This is 
similar to the idiom of ‘not letting perfect be the enemy of good’. 
Other Vanuatuan public accountability institutions 
There is also a broad range of institutions which strengthen and complement the functions of 
the Ombudsman and can also be regarded as having a role in upholding public accountability. 
In Vanuatu these include the Auditor-General, the Public Prosecutor, the Public Solicitor, the 
Public Service Commission, the Electoral Commission and the VLC. Similar to the 
Ombudsman some of these institutions are established in the Constitution (specifically the 
Auditor-General, the Public Prosecutor, the Public Solicitor, the Public Service Commission 
and the Electoral Commission) although none are given the same prominence as the 
Ombudsman which has its own Part within Chapter 9.  
These other institutions can be considered part of the broad accountability system in Vanuatu. 
This is because the Public Prosecutor and Public Solicitor have potential roles in enforcing 
and remedying corruption in public office. Similarly, the VLC has a public accountability 
input when it recommends potential reforms to existing integrity mechanisms, for example 
the Ombudsman and the Leadership Code. The Auditor-General has specific responsibilities 
for the audit and reporting on expenditure of public money, while the Public Service 
Commission is responsible for the management and performance of public officials. Finally, 
the Electoral Commission has a key role in ensuring the democratic accountability of the 
electoral process in Vanuatu and thus the selection of parliamentary representatives. All of 
these various institutions have important roles and functions and together form part of a 
community with interests and connections to upholding public accountability. 
Civil/community organisations in Vanuatu 
Additionally, civil and community organisation in Vanuatu have a role in supporting the 
public accountability principles upheld by the Ombudsman. One way that domestic 
organisations and local branches of global bodies promote and support public accountability 
in Vanuatu is through their public reactions to alleged instances of corruption and 
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maladministration. 56  For example, the Vanuatu Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations established a new group, the Vanuatu Corruption Commission. It explained 
that the formation of the Commission was prompted by prominent public scandals.57 Other 
domestic groups which have made public statements following developments of concern in 
public accountability terms are Youth Against Corruption Vanuatu and Vanuatu’s Women 
Against Crime and Corruption.  
The most prominent international organisation operating locally in Vanuatu was 
Transparency International Vanuatu which, for example, issued a series of updates on the 
‘National Integrity System’. 58  Three reports (all issued in 2013) contained positive 
recognition of the existing accountability institutions and suggestions to assist the 
achievement of their potential.59 The key role of development partners (principally France, 
Australia and New Zealand) providing targeted financial and public assistance can be 
demonstrated by the example of the French Embassy in Port Vila granting funding of Vatu 
390 000 to Transparency Vanuatu to support good governance and enable the printing of 
three information booklets in Bislama. 60  Sadly since this important work, in 2017 
Transparency International Vanuatu was officially described as a suspended chapter on the 
Transparency International website, meaning that it is no longer operational within 
Vanuatu.61 Thus there will be real challenges for Transparency International in order to 
continue important role previously performed by Transparency International Vanuatu given 
the absence of an effective and operational structure within Vanuatu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VANUATU 
Vanuatu Law Commission (VLC) review and report 
																																								 																				
56 For a detailed discussion of corruption in the South Pacific see Robert Hughes, ‘Corruption’ in Anita Jowitt 
and Dr Tess Newton Cain (eds), Passage of Change: Law, Society and Governance in the Pacific (ANU Press, 
2010) 35. 
57 Anti-corruption authorities, New anti-corruption group set up in Vanuatu 
<http://www.acauthorities.org/news/new-anti-corruption-group-set-vanuatu>. 
58  Transparency International, National Integrity System Update – Ombudsman and Office of the 
Auditor-General, Update #3, 27 September 2013, #2 20 September 2013 & #1 26 August 2013. 
59Ibid. 
60 Transparency International Vanuatu News Release dated 31 October 2013 <www.transparencyvanuatu.org> 
61  Transparency International, Transparency Vanuatu Suspended 
<https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/contact/org/nc_vanuatu>.  
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As explained above, the VLC also has an important role in public accountability through its 
capacity to undertake investigations and issue recommendations for law reform.62 It is not 
mentioned in the Vanuatu Constitution but is established by a specific Act – the Law 
Commission Act.63 As a piece of normal legislation, amendments to the Act and even repeal 
of the Act can therefore be made by the subsequent passage of an Act of Parliament. A 
further vulnerability of the VLC is that there is no statutory compulsion for the government 
either to adopt the final recommendations nor indeed to respond to them. 
In 2015, the VLC published two public Issues Papers – the first into the Ombudsman Act and 
the second into the Leadership Code Act.64 In respect of the Leadership Code Act, the referral 
to the VLC was made by the Office of the Ombudsman. The inquiry was concluded and one 
final report covering both topics (Ombudsman and Leadership Code) was published in 
October 2016.65 A total of 79 recommendations were issued - the majority concerned with the 
Ombudsman (the subject of 45 recommendations) and the remaining 34 on the Leadership 
Code.66 
The recommendations regarding the Ombudsman Act covered the qualifications, appointment 
process and conditions of employment for the Ombudsman with five recommendations – four 
of which suggest amendments to the Ombudsman Act.67 All relate to increasing flexibility in 
who may be appointed and providing certainty about the nature of the office. Significant 
attention was then given to the function of the Ombudsman including complaints and 
proceedings and immunities. 68 The Report focused on improving coordination and 
cooperation between the Ombudsman, Public Prosecutor and Police. The VLC also 
recommended that the Ombudsman be invested with the power to appoint its own officers 
and other staff (a power conferred in the original Act but not its successor).69 Finally, the 
report recommended that the Ombudsman should not have responsibility for overseeing 
																																								 																				
62 See Kalsakau A, ‘The Birth and Rebirth of Law Reform Agencies: The Establishment of Vanuatu’s Law 
Reform Commission’ (Paper presented at the Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference, September 2008). 
63 Originally introduced as JR 20 of 1980, with a commencement date of 30 July 1980. 
64 Vanuatu Law Commission, A Review of the Ombudsman Act, Issues Paper No 01 of 2015; Vanuatu Law 
Commission, Leadership Code Act, Issues Paper No 02 of 2015. 
65 Vanuatu Law Commission, Ombudsman and Leadership Code Act Legislative Review, No. 02/16, October 
2016. 
66 Ibid 155-66. 
67 Ibid recommendations 1, 2, 4 & 5 concern amendments to the Act, while recommendation 3 is that the Act 
remain unaltered with no age requirement for the Ombudsman. 
68 Vanuatu Law Commission, Ombudsman and Leadership Code Act Legislative Review, No. 02/16, October 
2016, recommendations 6 – 36 inclusive. 
69 Ibid recommendations 37 – 42 inclusive.  
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human rights issues and that instead a separate, independent National Human Rights 
Committee be established.70 
In respect of the Leadership Code Act there was a detailed and thorough review of the Act. 
The final report described the Act as ‘outdated and unsatisfactory’. 71  The report’s 
recommendations regarding this Act centred on five main areas: 
• Definition of leaders; 
• Breaches of the Leadership Code; 
• Annual returns; 
• Investigation and prosecution of leaders; and 
• Punishment of leaders. 
While acknowledging there was imprecision in the definition of leaders in the Act, the VLC 
determined that this was a matter more appropriately left for the courts to interpret. This will 
ensure future flexibility in the application of the Act. In respect of breaches, the VLC 
recommended that breaches be separated into two categories so that there is a distinction 
between serious and less serious breaches.72 Less serious breaches would then be dealt with 
by a new Leadership Tribunal while serious breaches would be a matter for the courts. As 
noted previously in this analysis there has been a consistent failure of leaders to file annual 
reports and there has been little enforcement of this obligation. To improve the transparency 
that annual reports would provide, the VLC recommended shifting the collection of such 
reports to the Ombudsman.73 In respect of investigation and prosecution of leaders, the 
principal recommendation was the need for an MOU between the Ombudsman, Public 
Prosecutors and Police (also referred to above on the Ombudsman’s general investigation 
powers). Finally, the VLC considered the issue of punishment and recommended increasing 
the fines but leaving the definitions unchanged to be interpreted by the courts.74 
However as explained previously, without a statutory obligation to respond to reports of the 
VLC, it will be for the government alone to decide what, if any, measures will be 
implemented. The important contribution of the VLC may go unrealised, as did past reviews 
																																								 																				
70 Ibid recommendations 43-5 inclusive. 
71 Ibid 19 & recommendations 1-4, pt 2. 
72 Ibid 19 & recommendations 5-8 pt 2. 
73 Ibid 20 & recommendations 9-19. 
74 Ibid recommendations 20-34. 
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of the Ombudsman conducted in 2001, 2002 and 2004.75 This history can be interpreted in 
both a positive and a negative manner. It is positive in the sense that VLC has shown 
consistent and enduring support for the Ombudsman and it highlights the capacity of the VLC 
to publicly foster a public accountability culture in Vanuatu. However, the lack of 
government response is also a negative in terms of achieving meaningful reforms. It 
concretely demonstrates that government support for a good public accountability 
environment is crucial where legislative action has been identified as needed, given the 
government has control over the legislative agenda.  
Another concern about the feasibility of the recommendations being implemented is the 
concomitant need for adequate resourcing of the new Leadership Tribunal and also the 
Ombudsman’s office in the eventuality it received the additional responsibility of collecting 
and enforcing the annual reports of leaders. This once again demonstrates the central 
influence of the government, given its control over public expenditure and budgetary 
allocations.  
Recent political developments and associated litigation 
Other recent events concerning public accountability worthy of brief comment include the 
political drama which unfolded in late 2015 involving the conviction of a number of 
Members of Parliament and then the subsequent pardoning of the same by the Acting 
President (whilst the President was absent overseas), and the issuing of a suspension order 
against the Ombudsman by the Acting President at the same time.76 The legality of the latter 
order was questioned by the Ombudsman, and whilst the former may be technically 
constitutional it is questionable in terms of public confidence in the political system. The 
Vanuatu Supreme Court was involved in a number of related cases which intersected with 
these developments, illustrating the close links between political events and the importance of 
an independent judiciary.77 Contemporaneous articles authored by Professor Paterson and a 
																																								 																				
75 Vanuatu Law Commission, Ombudsman and Leadership Code Act Legislative Review, No. 02/16, October 
2016,17 referring to the Wiltshire Review in 2001, the McDowell Report in 2002 and the Review Committee 
Report in 2004. 
76 See Don Paterson, ‘Chronicle of the Months of Political and Constitutional Crisis in Vanuatu 2014’ (2015) 2 
Journal of South Pacific Law C-3, 6; Lee-Anne Sackett, ‘Vanuatu Constitutional Cases Nos 6 and 7 of 2015: 
Article 38 Pardons and Multilingual Legal Interpretation Principles’ (2015) 2 Journal of South Pacific Law C-1, 
1 & 2. 
77 Nari v Republic of Vanuatu [2015] VUSC 132  
<http://www.paclii.org/cgibin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/2015/132.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=title(Nari%
20and%20Republic%20of%20Vanuatu%20)>;  
Public Prosecutor v Moana Kalosil and others - Judgment as to verdict [2015] VUSC 135  
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USP academic consider in detail the most significant of these cases and the implications 
arising from them.78 Additionally, academics Forsyth and Batley have also examined these 
recent developments and the subsequent court cases to determine what they reveal about 
checks and balances in Vanuatu governance.79 They conclude that ‘the existing checks and 
balances on the power of the executive … have provided Vanuatu’s system of governance 
with a demonstrable degree of resilience.’80 
One case arising from this sequence of events in particular warrants special mention in the 
context of this article with its primary focus on the Ombudsman – it is Nari (and others) v 
Republic of Vanuatu.81 In Nari, a judge of the Vanuatu Supreme Court considered the nature 
of the Ombudsman’s role and procedures established in the Ombudsman Act and ruled that 
the provisions in the Act did not breach the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution, 
although the procedures required by the Ombudsman Act were not followed. Justice Fatiaki 
quoted an earlier decision of the Vanuatu Supreme Court from 2001 in Ombudsman v Batick: 
The purpose of the Leadership Code and the (Ombudsman) Act are, among other 
things to prevent corruption in ‘high places' and the crippling effects it has on the 
economic and social systems of the country.82 
While there was a related subsequent Court of Appeal decision,83 the judgment of Justice 
Fatiaki remains relevant in that it highlighted a judicial observation on the social and civic 
desirability of a strong, independent and effective Ombudsman and on this aspect the Court 
of Appeal decision did not disagree or overturn. 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
<http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/2015/135.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=kalosil>; 
Public Prosecutor v Moana Kalosil and others - Sentence [2015] VUSC 149  
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Kalosil v Republic of Vanuatu [2016] VUSC 150  
<http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/sinodisp/vu/cases/VUSC/2016/150.html?stem=&synonyms=&query=kalosil>. 
78 Paterson & Sackett, above n 76. 
79 Miranda Forsyth & James Batley, ‘What the Political Corruption Scandal of 2015 Reveals about Checks and 
Balances in Vanuatu Governance’ (2016) 51(3) Journal of Pacific History 255. 
80 Ibid, 277. 
81 Nari v Republic of Vanuatu [2015] VUSC 132  
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82 Ibid [84]. 
83 Kalosil v Public Prosecutor [2015] VUCA 43; Criminal Appeal Case 12 of 2015 (20 November 2015). 
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Ultimately the remaining numerous, complex legal issues raised by these events and in the 
resulting cases did not require authoritative determination as a snap election was called for 22 
January 2016 and a new government was elected by the voters in Vanuatu.  
OTHER PACIFIC OMBUDSMEN 
The pervasiveness of the Ombudsman concept in the Pacific is underlined by the fact that 
seven of the 12 USP members (this figure includes Vanuatu) and PNG have established an 
Ombudsman or equivalent institution. The following table details the title of the office, the 
enabling legislation and a summary of the appointment process for each of the six USP 
members and PNG, which have an Ombudsman or equivalent (information for Vanuatu has 
not been included in the table as it was subject to detailed consideration in the above analysis).  
Table 1: Comparison of Ombudsman provisions in six USP members and PNG 
Comparator Enabling 
Legislation 
Appointment Process 
Cook Islands Ombudsman Act 
1984 
Appointed by the Head of State on 
recommendation of the legislature.84  
Fiji85 Constitution 201386 Appointed by President, on the advice 
of the Judicial Services Commission 
following consultation by it with the 
Attorney-General.87 
Samoa Ombudsman 
(Komesina O 
Sulufaiga) Act 201388 
Appointed by the Head of State on 
recommendation of the Legislative 
Assembly.89 
																																								 																				
84 Cook Islands, Ombudsman Act 1984 s 3.  
85 In Fiji, the title is Accountability and Transparency Commissioner, not Ombudsman although the functions 
are substantially similar. 
86 In Fiji, there have been several written constitutions since independence in 1970. The previous constitution 
was enacted in 1997 (1997 Constitution of Fiji) and contained provisions establishing an Ombudsman in ss 157-
65. That Constitution was abolished in 2009. In 2013, a new constitution came into effect, and under s 121 of 
the 2013 Constitution the Accountability and Transparency Commission, which is in effect an Ombudsman, was 
established. Also relevant is the Code of Conduct Bill 2016. The Bill has been tabled in Parliament and is 
currently before the Parliamentary Committee on Justice, Law and Human Rights for consideration. 
87 Fiji Constitution 2013 s 121(2). 
88 This Act repealed and replaced the Samoan Ombudsman (Komesina o Salufaiga) Act 1988. 
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Solomon Islands Constitution of 
Solomon Islands & 
Ombudsman 
(Further Provision) 
Act 1980 
Appointed by the Governor-General 
after consultation with the Speaker of 
the Parliament & the chairpersons of 
the Public Service Commission, 
Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission.90  
Tonga Ombudsman Act 
201691 
Appointed by the Speaker with the 
consent of the Legislative 
Assembly.92  
Tuvalu Leadership Code Act 
2008, specifically 
part IV 
Chief Ombudsman appointed by the 
Head of State, acting on advice of a 
committee comprising of the Prime 
Minister (chairperson), the Speaker, 
the Chief Justice, the Chairman of the 
Public Service Commission & the 
President of the Ekalesia Kelisiano o 
Tuvalu.93 
PNG Constitution	197594 
& the Organic Law 
on the Ombudsman 
Commission 
Head of State on advice which must 
come from a special ad hoc body 
called the Ombudsman Appointments 
Committee. 
 
Of the seven Pacific nations and territories with Ombudsman or equivalent institutions, four 
have embedded the institution into their respective constitutions. These four are Vanuatu (as 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
89 Samoa Komesina O Sulufaiga (Ombudsman) Act 2013 s 7. 
90 Constitution of the Solomon Islands s 96. 
91  The Tongan Commissioner for Public Relations (Amendment) Act 2016 amended the title of the 
Commissioner for Public Relations Act 2001 to the Ombudsman Act 2016. 
92 Section 5 of the Tongan Commissioner for Public Relations (Amendment) Act 2016, now the Ombudsman Act 
2016.  
93 Tuvaluan Leadership Code Act 2008 s 40. Ombudsman Commissioners (Junior) shall be appointed for three 
years by the Head of State, acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Service Commission given after 
consultation with the Chief Ombudsman per s 41 of the Leadership Code Act 2008. 
94 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 1975 pt VIII, div 2. 
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analysed in detail above), Fiji, the Solomon Islands and PNG. Solomon Islands has a 
structural model for the Ombudsman that is similar to Vanuatu, with specific provisions on 
the Ombudsman in Chapter ix, sections 96-99 of the Constitution of Solomon Islands. This 
entrenchment is then supplemented by a specific Act – the Ombudsman (Further Provision) 
Act 1980. Fiji has embarked on a somewhat different model and title for the institution, with 
specific provisions contained in a Code of Conduct Bill rather than a stand-alone 
Ombudsman Act. PNG has embedded the Ombudsman Commission into the Constitution in 
sections 217-220 inclusive and it also has the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission 
which has a higher status than a normal Act of Parliament. 
There are five Pacific USP nations and territories which do not currently have an 
Ombudsman, though in four of these there are nonetheless other oversight and accountability 
institutions. Kiribati has a Public Service Commission and Auditor-General. The Marshall 
Islands has an Auditor-General’s Office. Nauru has a Department of Audit. Niue has a Public 
Service Commission. Thus, Tokelau stands as the only USP member without a dedicated 
public service or audit institution meaning it has minimal structures to support and encourage 
public accountability.  
In 2009, a report was published by the Australian Ombudsman on an investigation into 
complaint handling mechanisms in Pacific Island nations and territories without an 
Ombudsman.95 Selection of the included nations and territories was based upon membership 
of the Pacific Island Forum, which is different to USP members, but for the purposes of this 
analysis did include Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Niue.96 In each of these nations 
and territories the position as at May 2009 was reported along with next steps to foster good 
government administration. The Report referred to the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance, which 
is a regional organisation describing itself as ‘a service delivery and mutual support 
organisation for Ombudsman and allied institutions of countries that are members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum’ and which ‘strengthens cooperation within the community of Pacific 
																																								 																				
95 Commonwealth Ombudsman, Complaint Handling in Pacific Island Nations with an Ombudsman, Report of 
the 2008 Study Tour co-ordinated by the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman with members of the 
Pacific Ombudsman Network, May 2009. 
96 It also included Tuvalu, which subsequently created an Ombudsman in 2014 refer to Table 1: Comparison of 
Ombudsman Provisions in Six USP Members & PNG above. 
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Ombudsman and allied institutions’. 97  It is relevant to note that although the Pacific 
Ombudsman Alliance has a website, there has been no news items uploaded since 2014.98 
The Australian Ombudsman’s Report also acknowledged the proposal for a regional 
Ombudsman service was recommended in the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional 
Cooperation and Integration (‘the Pacific Plan’).99 The Pacific Plan was adopted in 2005, 
revised in 2007 and reviewed in 2013. After this review the Framework for Pacific 
Regionalism (‘the Framework’) was adopted in 2014 and commenced in 2015. It states that it: 
… replaced the Pacific Plan and is intended to ‘support focussed political 
conversations and settlements that address key strategic issues, including shared 
sovereignty, pooling resources and delegating decision-making … Rather than 
providing a list of regional priorities, it sets out a robust process through which 
regional priorities will be identified and implemented.100  
Unlike the Pacific Plan, the Framework does not expressly refer to the Ombudsman, so it 
may be concluded that the regional Ombudsman has faded as an express initiative, and there 
has been an emergence of the locally tailored solutions detailed at the start of this paragraph. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Public accountability is now a critical, universal and established concept in global 
development discourse and public law research/publications.101 This is evidenced by the 
world-wide trend towards implementation and establishment of public accountability 
institutions whether in nations with common law or civil law jurisdictions or pluralistic legal 
systems. This analysis and the recent developments in Vanuatu underline the critical 
importance of public accountability institutions, such as the Ombudsman, and the sometimes 
difficult path taken by those who perform public accountability duties. Such office holders 
																																								 																				
97 Information retrieved from the website of the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance at 
<http://www.pacificombudsman.org/> (accessed on 6 October 2017). 
98 See <http://www.pacificombudsman.org/newss>.  
99  Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration (2005) 
<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/robp-pac-2010-2013-oth01.pdf>. The Australian 
Ombudsman 2009 report described the ‘Pacific Plan’ as a living document that forms the basis for ongoing 
strengthening of regional cooperation and integration efforts. Therefore, the ‘Pacific Plan’ provided an 
aspirational target for member states to continuously work towards. It has since been superseded. 
100 Framework for Pacific Regionalism (2014), 2 
<http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/embeds/file/Framework%20for%20Pacific%20Regionalism_book
let.pdf>. 
101 See generally, Wesley, above n 1, A-2.  
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and the staff who support them need public support - especially from community groups - 
and sustained government funding. There is also a key role for public leaders (in either 
formal or informal civil organisations), lawyers, law students and legal academics in 
supporting and advocating for public accountability institutions.  
There is no simple, cheap or quick solution to improving public accountability but rather it is 
a process of building upon already solid foundations and a range of institutions and 
mechanisms, combined with domestic support as well as that from regional nations and 
organisations, and development partners. Whilst the existing public accountability system in 
Vanuatu is not perfect and operates with limitations, the constitutional embedding of the 
Ombudsman and the Leadership Code does provide a more permanent foundation for these 
important institutions than ordinary legislation would provide. A complex issue such as 
achieving good governance requires a complex web of solutions and support of all leaders 
throughout society. Indeed, there has been recognition that good governance can be fostered 
alongside traditional culture in a ‘hybrid modernity in which Western notions of rationality 
and ethics co-exist with resilient indigenous ways of knowing and being’ which honour 
communal responsibilities for example.102  
The above analysis documents that there are many different models that have been adopted 
amongst USP members to improve public accountability and foster integrity in government 
decision-making. All USP members have recognised the importance of complaint handling 
mechanisms and a majority have created Ombudsman or similar institutions. Of those with 
such institutions, three USP members have constitutionally entrenched provisions which 
provide an additional level of independence and protection. An Ombudsman will usually 
have the defining characteristic of self-initiated investigations, also called ‘own motion 
powers’ and this ability extends the Ombudsman powers beyond those exercised by a Public 
Service Commission or Auditor-General. It is for that reason, combined with the benefit of 
institutional independence, that the creation of a separate Ombudsman or similar institution 
has evolved to become the dominant model of investigation in the Pacific. Of course, these 
institutions also operate within a broader judicial system and the inherent powers of courts to 
conduct judicial review of government/executive decisions. Together, they form a community 
of accountability. 
																																								 																				
102 Ibid A-5.  
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By taking a longer-term view of the objective of public accountability, this analysis in not 
intended in any way as a criticism of the progress made by any Pacific nation in terms of 
strengthening public accountability, but rather a formal recording of the different approaches 
taken to public accountability within the Pacific (with the Vanuatuan Ombudsman as a case 
study), and the potential for further strengthening of national commitments to the ideals of 
public accountability and integrity. The limitations of existing public accountability 
mechanisms have been identified throughout the analysis and these stand as areas for future 
improvement. The case study of the Vanuatuan Ombudsman adopted in this analysis provides 
one example where the constitutional entrenchment has been able to provide a firm 
foundation for public accountability – initially without the passing of specific Acts of 
parliament. It can be argued that the Constitutional enshrinement of the Vanuatuan 
Ombudsman’s functions has assisted the office and its activities to withstand constitutional 
challenges alleging it infringes on fundamental rights also guaranteed in the Constitution. 
That said, there is no certain or infallible method for upholding public accountability as 
legislation, common law and even written constitutions can be susceptible to change or even 
neglect in any nation. Care must also be exercised to avoid simplistic solutions or solutions 
that claim to be universalist – such solutions are at risk of cultural inappropriateness and 
leading to institutional transplants without substance and effect in the local communities they 
seek to serve.103 Finally, constitutional embedding and endowment with legislative powers 
will not of themselves lead to a successful Ombudsman. What will also be a necessity is 
political will from the government, academics and public institutions to support the 
operations of the Ombudsman. Challenges for Ombudsman offices can arise in the areas of 
staff and other physical resources, budget allocations, technical knowledge, and at times 
government obstruction or inaction.104 
However, the foundations that these various elements provide can be the base for sustained 
strengthening in public accountability - like a tree that will grow stronger if it is planted in 
good soil. Good soil though is not of itself sufficient, trees require a complete, holistic 
environment in order to thrive. 
 
																																								 																				
103 See generally, Sheehy and Maogoto, above n 11, 133, 138. 
104 See generally, Prasad, above n 20, 124, 126. 
